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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
.vs. 
K. NORMAN COX, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil NO. 904402060 
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31, 
1992. Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. 
Weight, Esq. Defendant appeared in person and by counsel, 
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq. The parties 
presented a Stipulation to the Courr. The Courr proceeded to 
hear the matter on its merits and now enters the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff meets the residency 
requirements of the divorce statutes of the State of Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the parties have experienced 
irreconcilable differences, such that Plaintiff should be awarded 
a decree of divorce. 
3. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendanr were 
married for fewer than three years. From the day they were 
married, July 1, 1988, to the-date of their final separation, 
December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine 
months. Of the twenty-nine month marriage, the parties 
experienced a brief trial separation of five months. 
4. The Court finds that at the time of their marriage, 
Plaintiff was 47 years old and Defendant was 56 years old. This 
was Plaintiff's third marriage and Defendant's second. No 
children were born into the marriage. 
5. The Court finds that in 1966, Defendant built a house 
at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah, 84058. Defendanr raised nine 
children in this house and paid off a twenty year VA mortgage 
sometime in 1987. At the time of the parries' marriage, July l, 
1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien. 
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6* The Court finds that prior to the parties' marriage, 
Plaintiff sold her separate residence against the advise of 
Defendant, and her brother-in-law, an accountant. From the 
$21,000 proceeds of the that sale, Plaintiff repaid her parents 
the $18,000 she had borrowed from them to purchase the home. 
7. The Court finds that prior to the marriage, Plaintiff 
had a net worth of $74,000. Plaintiff's $74,000 net worth 
included the $18,000 she repaid to her parents. The Court finds 
that Defendant had a net worth, of $368,000. 
8. The Court finds that prior to the marriage, the parties 
executed an Antenuptial Agreement. Plaintiff executed the 
Antenuptial Agreement on June 28, 1988 and Defendant executed the 
Antenuptial Agreement on June 30, 1988. Defendant intended for 
his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be 
protected under the provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement, and 
Plaintiff had knowledge of Defendant's intent to protect his 
personal home. Under the provisions of the Antenuptial 
Agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to 
dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or 
otherwise. 
9. The Court finds that nearly contemporaneous with the 
parties' signing of the Antenuptial Agreement, Defendant executed 
3 
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a Warranty Deed granting Plaintiff a joint interest in his 
premarital home. 
10. The Court finds that Plaintiff's attorney in 1988, Doug 
Nielsen, advised and counseled the parties regarding the 
execution of the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed. Mr. 
Nielsen drafted the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed. 
Defendant's attorney, Phil Ivie, was not present at any of the 
meetings held between the parties and Mr. Nielsen. Mr. Nielsen 
did not send the Warranty Deed^to Mr. Ivie, for his review, nor 
did Mr. Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the 
Warranty Deed. 
11. The Court finds that the provisions of the Warranty 
Deed are patently incompatible with the protection provision of 
the Antenuptial Agreement. The Antenuptial Agreement was clearly 
intended by the parties to protect their separate property. That 
is precisely why they sought the services of an attorney. 
Clearly, the Warranty Deed was an afterthought by the parties. 
12. The Court finds the value of Defendant's home prior to 
marriage and prior to the remodeling was $77,000.00. The Court 
finds that Plaintiff expended $18,062.65 for remodeling of 
Defendant's premarital home (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent 
by Plaintiff prior to the marriage and prior to the execution of 
4 
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the Antenuptial Agreement). The Courr finds that Plaintiff 
received $5,500 from Defendant as reimbursement: of the amounts 
expended by her. The Court finds that Plaintiff expended 
$12,562.65 and that Defendant spent $11,931.00 on the remodeling. 
13. The Court finds that the fair market value of 
Defendant's premarital home at the time of the parties' 
separation was $105,Q00.00. Defendant's premarital home did not 
increase in value as a result of Plaintiff's remodeling 
expenditures. The value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988 
plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling 
or $106,993.65, exceeds the $105,000 fair market value of the 
home. 
14. The Court finds that both parties liquidated separate 
assets and invested them in the marriage. The Court finds 
Plaintiff expended $74,000.00 during marriage, of which Plaintiff 
paid in excess of $3 0,000 to her children. The Court finds 
Defendant expended $109,114.45 during the marriage. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff's net worth at the time 
of separation was $10,53 9.00 and Defendant's net worth at the 
time of separation was $232,249. Plaintiff's net decrease was 
$63,461 and Defendant's net decrease was $135,709. 
5 
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16. The Court finds that the parties should be awarded the 
personal property as it has been divided between the parties. 
The Court finds that Defendant should pay the remaining debt owed 
to Zion's First National Bank, which was incurred in February, 
1989; the proceeds of which were used for the acquisition of 
personal property. 
17. The Court finds that expenditures made by either party 
prior to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling 
costs), or after the separation date, December l, 199 0, are not 
claimed, at issue, or reimbursable. 
18. The Court finds that Defendant paid to Plaintiff 
$10,725.00 during the marital period. This amount includes the 
$5,500 amount Defendant paid to Plaintiff to reimburse her for 
her remodeling costs. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff's current gross monthly 
income is $1,850.00 and Defendant's current gross monthly income 
from unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month. Defendant's 
historical income is irrelevant because of his sale of his 
business and because his physical disability precludes him from 
seeking full-time employment in his area of training; autobody 
repair. 
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20. The Court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant 
are able to meet their respective financial obligations. Both 
parties suffered significant financial reversals during the very 
short marriage and Defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly 
lacking. 
21. The Court finds that Defendanr proffered a $24,000 
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff on or about August 12, 1992, which 
Plaintiff declined to accept. Subsequent to August 12, 1992, 
Defendant incurred $4,649 in attorneys fees and costs. 
22. The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded all 
right, title and interest in all real property he brought into 
the marriage, including his premarital home and other personal 
properties not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff. 
23. The Court finds that Plaintiff should be awarded all 
rights, title and interest she has in and to her retirement. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of divorce from 
and against Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon 
signing by the Court and entry by the Clerk in the Registry of 
Actions. 
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2. Plaintiff should be awarded the personal property she 
presently has in her possession. Defendant should be awarded the 
personal property he presently has in his possession. 
3. Defendant should be ordered to pay the debt owing to 
Zion's First National Bank, which was incurred in February of 
1989. Each party should be ordered to pay all debts he or she 
incurred prior to their marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the 
remodeling costs) or after the separation date of 12/1/90 (but 
for Defendant's attorneys fees, and costs incurred subsequent to 
8/12/92)• 
4. Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for 
her pre-marriage and post marriage expenditures for remodeling 
Defendant's premarital home, located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, 
Utah, in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. 
5. Defendant should be awarded legal title and possession 
of all real property he brought into the marriage, including his 
personal home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah and all 
personal property not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to immediately reconvey to 
Defendant by quit claim deed, title to Defendant's premarital 
home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah. 
8 
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded all rights, title and 
interest she has in her retirement and savings. 
8. Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony. 
9. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's 
attorneys fees and costs incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992 
in the amount of $4,649; $2,3 60 for the legal services of Richard 
L. Peel, Esq-, and $2,239 for legal services rendered by Marilyn 
Moody Brown, Esq. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to restoration of her maiden 
name. 
Let a decree be entered accordingly. 
DATED this ^?<^ day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
9 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Gary 
Weight, Esq., attorney for Plaintiff, at Aldridge, Nelson, Weight 
& Esplin, Post Office Box L, Provo, Utah 34603 this day of 
October, 1992. 
10 
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MARILYN MOODY BROWN, ESQ. #4803 
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80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
RICHARD L. PEEL, ESQ. 
Nevada State Bar #4359 
228 S. Fourth Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89101 
Telephone: (702) 382-0711 
Attorneys for Defendant K. NORMAN COX 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K. NORMAN COXf 
Defendant. 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
Civil NO. 904402060 
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31, 
1992. The Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. 
Weight, Esq. The Defendant appeared in person and by counsel, 
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq. The parties 
presented a Stipulation to the Court. The Courr proceeded to 
hear the matter on its merits and having heretofore entered its 
- 1 -
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf now enters the 
following: 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and 
against the Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon 
signing by the Court and entry of the Clerk in the Registry of 
Actions. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the personal property she 
presently has in her possession. 
3. Defendant is awarded the personal property he presently 
has in his possession. 
4. Defendant is ordered to pay the debt owing to Zion's 
First National Bank, which was incurred in February of 1989. 
Each party is ordered to pay his or her own debts incurred prior 
to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling costs), or 
after the separation date, December 1, 1990. 
5. Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff within sixty (60) 
days from the date of this decree, Plaintiff's pre-marriage and 
post marriage remodeling expenditures, in the stipulated amount 
of $12,562.65. 
6. Defendant is awarded all real property which he brought 
into the marriage, including his personal home located at 773 
- 2 -
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South 400 Eastf Orem, Utah, and all personal property not 
otherwise awarded 11 i .o n. 
7. Plaintiff Is ordered to immediately reconvey to 
Defendant by quiz 3iaim deed, -ir!e -~ Defendant's premari**-1 
home located 
8. Plaint..:i _. ^warded ... ricrnz, title and interest she 
has in her retirement and savings. 
9. F1 ' > , , ienied. 
10. ^^xwL.r: ^o ^ rdered^to pay within sixty (60) days 
the date of this Decree, Defendant's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred subsequen
 fc ,.-,- 0 
t ichard Peel, Esq- ...^  ^  , .. - •.::.;:. Moody Brown, Esq. 
Defendant may ^ r nis :~~ \ z:\ m*: -r/ permission r^ '-:: :rtorne^ 
deduct such .~~ * •- _ , _ _ _ .;^  ^s 
ordered t.c ^ ay Plaintiff. 
Let a decree be entered accordingly. 
DATED this Z& ""• >it i .I..-L 1-2. 
BY THE QeURT: 
•district (four 
•U 
^ 
# 
'••A . 5;o"e»«oo«'rc 
P 1 '7 
APPROVED AS TO FOPM: 
V~c, M lUrlapr 
GZBgJ#EXG& j 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
ilh BOUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET K, t"(JX, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
K. NORMAN m \ 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Case No. 904402060 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the court The plaintiff 
appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. Weight, Esq. The defendant appeared in person 
and by counsel, Marilyn Moor and Richard Peel, Esq. The parties presented 
a stipulation and made opening arguments At issue was (1) the award of IMMIMNU I ; | iiie 
fair and nnuuhlr LIIVIMI'II ,'t ,iy;i:t:» JJILI I JI the award of attorney's fees. Evidence was taken 
and the matter was taken under advisement. The court received a supplemental 
- :—o- :ienaant and both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. This court has fully considered ihr i'\ iclrii.1. iwi'iin .r^ jida submitted by 
111 J 11 :»c i . i J i d () i";ij argument. 
The court, being fully advised in thr premises, no w enters its: 
1 
RULING 
I. ALIMONY 
Plaintiff seeks alimony in this case. The court will consider three factors in 
determining an award of alimony: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Burt v. Burt. 799 
P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990). 
A. Facts. 
In this case, the defendant sold his busmess after the separation of the parties. He 
had some employment with Utah Valley Community College but has not been able to renew 
his contract. He presently receives temporary unemployment compensation of $554.00 per 
month and is seeking gainful employment. Those unemployment benefits commenced the 
second week of July and will continue for twenty-six weeks. His historical earnings prove to 
be $1,457.00 per month and his earnings at UVCC were $17.65 per hour for approximately 
15 hours per week. In addition, he receives $500.00 per month from the sale of his 
business. He suffers from a physical disability, necessitating knee operations. He cannot 
afford the operation which, if performed, would lay him up for six months. He borrows 
between $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children in order to meet his financial 
obligations. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, earns $1,850.00 gross income and receives $1,134.00 net 
2 
income ilLcx deductions for taxes and retirement and savings accounts. Even the plaintiff 
recognizes that the present circumstances nl" lime panics <li I H Cm u> compel an award of 
alimony to the plaintiff. The defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly lacking at the 
present time. His historic' oecause of his sale of his business and 
because his physical disability now precludes him from seeking jobs in his area of training; 
autobody rpp-'iii 
It is important to note that plaintiff has enrolled in an Executive Masters 
rnhhi Viiinuustraciuii iJirough Brigham Young University. That executive program is 
conducted at night and will not interfere with her employment ung 
will pay plaintiffs full tuition, but not associated costs. 
It is clear from the evidence that neither " meet respective financial 
obligations. The plaintiff, since separation, has purchased a condominium and encumbered 
herself with a mortgage. Defenrnni lu\ nild -iff Numerous personal items, a gun collection, 
snowmobiles, cars, etc in attempting to finance the marriage. He also assumed new 
during the marriage. Most niarkeuiblc personal items have been sold. 
Decision 
A Burt v. Bun, it is clear that the financial conditions and needs 
of both parties are deplorable. The plaintiff has enrolled \ inn paio nnniiiau.' pruyram 
nil ilic lujpei) tit bettering her financial position. Defendant currently has no such 
opportunity. Defendant has no current employ * „ . ._ disabilities, no 
3 
reasonably foreseeable ability to obtain employment and to pay alimony. The marriage is of 
a very short duration and both parties suffered significant financial reversals during the 
marriage. Accordingly, no alimony award is merited. 
H. PROPERTY DIVISION 
A. Facts 
The parties married on July 1, 1988, in South Jordan, Utah. At marriage, plaintiff 
was 47 years old and defendant was 56 years old. Their marriage was the third for the 
plaintiff and second for the defendant. There were no children as issue of the marriage. 
The marriage is of short duration (29 montfis), including a 5 month trial separation. 
The financial declarations of both parties support the fact that this marriage was a financial 
disaster for both parties. 
The parties stipulated to various facts which affect property settlement matters and the 
court adopts the following: 
1. Remodeling costs. The amount spent on remodeling by plaintiff was a total of 
$18,062.65 (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent by plaintiff in remodeling prior to the 
marriage and prior to the execution of the antenuptial agreement). Plaintiff received $5,500 
from defendant as reimbursement of the amounts expended by her. Plaintiff spent 
$12,562,65 for remodeling. Defendant spent approximately $11,931 on remodeling. 
Remodeling was completed in order to accommodate the combination of the two families. 
2. Personal property. The personal property will be awarded to the parties as it 
4 
hi i«: iwn dn'ult,'i| defendant will assume the debt to Zion's First National Bank which was 
incurred in February, 1989 by the parties and was used Lw thr .wquisition I Hie personal 
. /-c nach party will pay all other debts he or she incurred after the separation date of 
12/1/90, 
Expenditures prior to marriage and post separation. Expenditures made by 
either party prior to il ,. iiaiTiape ibin im dm remodeling costs) or after the separation date 
(December 1, 1990), are not claimed,-at issue, or reimbursable. 
4, /alue of separate property. The parties stipulate that the actual amounts that 
should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for Norman 
been$368 I KM I and the amount that should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for 
Janet Cox was $74,000. 
5, Net worth of parties at time of separation. (The court chooses to accept the 
appraisal of Timothy Campbell). Plaintiff separation was $10,539. 
Defendant's net worth at time of separation was $232,249. The plaintiffs net decrease was 
563,461. The defendant's net dearer sv ,r " ^,; W. 
6. Amount of cash given bv defendant to plaintiff. The amount of cash paid, to 
the plaintiff .during the mar> ' • defendant was $10,725 (inclusive of 
reimbursement of remodeling costs). 
7. Expenditures by the parties. Plaintiffs expenditures during the marriage was 
574,000. Additionally, plaintiff gave to her children 
5 
plaintiff paid to her children by check (some of which is included above) is $31,284.15. 
Defendant's expenditures during the marriage were 5109,114.45. 
8. Current income. Plaintiffs current gross income is $1,850.00 per month. 
Defendant's current unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month. The defendant's 
historical income is $1457.00 per month. 
9. Cabin and retirement benefits. The plaintiff waives her claim for an interest in 
defendant's cabin. The defendant waives his claim for an interest in plaintiffs retirement or 
any other property belonging to plaintiff. The plaintiff waives any interest in defendant's 
business or proceeds from the sale of business or any other property belonging to defendant. 
Prior to marriage, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement and the defendant 
intended for his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be protected under the 
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff had knowledge of defendant's intent to 
protect his personal home. The agreement was executed on June 30, 1988, two days prior to 
the marriage. Nearly contemporaneous with the signing of the prenuptial agreement, (June 
29, 1988), defendant executed a warranty deed granting plaintiff a joint interest in his 
premarital home. 
The protection provision of the antenuptial agreement is patently incompatible with 
the provisions of the deed. Plaintiffs attorney in 1988, Doug Nielsen, advised and 
counseled the parties regarding the execution of the antenuptial agreement and warranty 
deed. Mr. Nielsen drafted the antenuptial agreement and the warranty deed. Defendant's 
6 
i i i t o r n e v , Ph i l I ne,, \ as uot present at any of the meetings held between the parties and Mr. 
Nielsen. Mr. Nielsen did not send the warranty deed to Mr 
Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the warranty deed. It is unclear from the 
disparate testimony of the witnesses whether defend? . sr he truly 
intended to grant a joint interest to the plaintiff, irrespective of the mutually acknowledged 
protection provision r.i tin* iiitnniDUal aiTieTknit 
The defendant built the subject house in 1966, raised nine children there, and paid off 
hisrwmiv VVAI Y,\ murtgage ijonietiine in 1"»jlK ." U the time of the marriage of the parties 
In 1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien. 
i the residence at separation was disputed, and the court accepts the more 
professional appraisal of Mr. Timothy Campbell which established the 
There ^ "«» dispute that the value of the subject premises at the time of the marriage was 
577,000.00. '• 
Just prior to the marriage, plaintiff sold her separate residence. There is evidence 
that plaintiffs brother, an.accounta* :.. • : iuvised her to keep the home. 
From the proceeds of that sale, plaintiff paid her parents $18,000.00. They, evidently had 
loaned her .money to \ i true that plaintiff liquidated her 
home in anticipation of the marriage, it is also true that she had little equity " e. 
'ii losmj1, iie * -v . -...*. vas immediately paid to her 
parents. It appears that plaintiffs net worth at the time she execm^i me pn'iuipruu 
7 
agreement, $74,000, included the $18,000.00 which she repaid to her parents. Plaintiff 
expended approximately $74,000.00 during the marriage. She liquidated some assets and 
approximately $30,000.00 was given directly to her children during the marriage. In light of 
the above, plaintiffs argument of detrimental reliance appears to lack foundation. 
B. DISCUSSION 
The stipulation resolves all property disputes except for a consideration of the division 
of defendant's premarital home. The prenuptial agreement protects defendant's interest and 
the warranty deed purports to convey a one half interest to plaintiff. Article I of the 
antenuptial agreement provides that each party's separate property and the proceeds thereof 
would remain separate. 
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a one half interest in the defendant's premarital 
home. Defendant argues that plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement for her pre and post 
marriage remodeling cost, and any accrued valued. This court is more persuaded by 
defendant's argument. The court adopts the following reasoning of defendant. 
Utah court have held that disposition of property under an antenuptial agreement is 
valid as long as there is no fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. D'Aston v. D'Aston. 
808 P.2d Lll (Ut.App. 1990); Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271 (Ut.App. 1988). The 
antenuptial agreement the plaintiff executed on June 28, 1988, was validly executed and was 
not subject to fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. The parties entered into the 
agreement upon plaintiffs request, her attorney drafted the agreement, the parties were 
8 
immMHii ilic agreement •< ,i. .1 1., signed and notarized, and as consideration therefore both 
parties, separate property was protected. Additionally, plaintiffs own attorney signed the 
jgreemeiii and certified that he consulted with plaintiff and advised her of her property rights 
and the legal significance of the antenuptial agreement. 
I He Utah Court of Appeals held that under the terms of an antenuptial agreement 
where each party has relinquished all 
party, he or she has no right to the other party's separate property nor any increase in value 
that might nrmir rn t!ii,iil [uopiTt,', Rudman v. Rudman,, 812 P 2d 1 3, 1 3 ( U t.App, 1991); 
Berman, 749 P.2d at 1271.l 
oh courts have not directly addressed the question of whether a warranty 
deed with rights of survivorship executed subsequent to an antenuptial agreement abrogates 
jid provisions of the antenuptial agreement. However, other jurisdictions have 
[The Rudman court held that ,under the parties antenuptial 
agreement, the husband's premarital property together with any 
increase would remain the property of the husbandf in spite of 
the fact that the-wife contributed labor and/or assets to the 
property during marriage. Rudman, 812 P.2d at 78. In Berman, 
the court overturned the lower court's order awarding the wife 
one-half the equity in the husband's separate property home 
purchased prior to marriage. The Berman court held that the 
antenuptial agreement preserved the husband's house as his 
separate property. The court based its reversal on evidence 
presented at trial wherein the wife knowingly and voluntarily 
entered the antenuptial agreement, no fraud or undue influence 
induced the wife to sign the agreement and the agreement stated 
that real property owned by the parties at the time of marriage 
was to remain the separate property of each spouse. Berman, 74 9 
P.2d at 1271. 
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confronted this very issue. In Peet v. Monger. 56 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1953), the parties 
entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. Subsequent to the parties' 
execution of the antenuptial agreement, the wife executed a joint tenancy deed which 
contained no language expressly affecting the cancellation of the antenuptial agreement. The 
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision by finding that, under the antenuptial 
agreement, the husband had no interest in or control over the joint tenancy property unless he 
survived the wife. See also In Re Marriage of Van Brocklin. 468 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa App. 
1991). 
In the case at hand, the warranty deed witiTrights of survivorship is void of language 
expressly canceling the antenuptial agreement. In fact, the deed expressly states that the 
deed is subject to all "existing covenants of whatever nature." Additionally, the antenuptial 
agreement existed at the time the warranty deed was executed and plaintiff had knowledge 
that the antenuptial agreement she executed on June 28, 1988 attempted to control and 
preserve the same property covered by the warranty deed. 
Plaintiff next argues that the antenuptial agreement was abrogated when the parties 
liquidated and expended their separate property in support of the marriage. This argument is 
baseless. Recital "E" of the antenuptial agreement expressly provides: 
Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage or dispose separately by 
gift, will or otherwise all of his or her estate to the same extent as if each of 
such parties remained single. 
Clearly, by executing the antenuptial agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to 
10 
dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or otherwise.2 
Accordingly, the antenuptial agreement was not abrogated as to defendant's separate 
property which was not commingled or liquidated, and these assets are still protected under 
the provisions of the antenuptial agreement. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on several occasions that a trial court is not bound 
by the state of title to real property prior to the issuance of a divorce decree. Georgedes v. 
Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981); Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 
1980); Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); Lundgreen v. Lundgreen. 
184 P.2d 670 (Utah 1947). A trial court is empowered to make distributions as are just and 
equitable and may compel such conveyances as are necessary to that end. Jackson. 617 P.2d 
at 341. 
In upholding the lower court's decision in Georgedes. 627 P.2d at 45, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that it was equitable to return to the husband a home and business which 
he had brought into the marriage, notwithstanding that title had been placed in joint tenancy. 
According to the Georgedes court, the trial court's decree simply put the parties to a second 
2In Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that separate property loses its separate 
character when the marital parties have inextricably commingled 
the separate property with marital property or when they have 
contributed all or part of the separate property to the marital 
estate. See also Rudman, 312 P.2d at 78. The analysis of both 
the Rudman and the Burt courts clearly indicates that separate 
property may be transmuted by the parties into marital property 
if such property cannot be traced to a separate property source. 
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marriage of relatively short real duration back into sole ownership of the properties they 
brought into the marriage. Id. at 45. 
In upholding the lower court's decision in Jesperson. 610 P.2d at 328, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where the wife had used her separate property to purchase a mobile 
home during marriage and even though the mobile home was held in joint tenancy and 
substantially improved by the husband's labors, it was equitable for the lower court to award 
her an amount equal to the value of the assets she brought into the marriage. 
And, in a case which is factually similar to the case at hand, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Lundgreen. held that a wife was only entitled to receive one-half the market value in 
excess of the original purchase price of a home purchased during marriage with the 
husband's separate assets, even though the home was held in joint tenancy and the wife had 
contributed extensive labor and separate funds in remodeling the home. 184 P.2d at 672.3 
In arguing that she is entitled to one-half the value of defendant's separate property 
home, plaintiff relies on Hogue v. Hogue 831 P.2d 121 (UtApp. 1992). In Hogue, the sole 
issue before the Utah Court of Appeals was whether a grantor spouse who conveyed his 
3A. common factual theme exists in the Georcredes, Jesperson 
and Lundareen cases and the case at hand. In each situation, the 
parties were married for less than seven years, no children were 
born into the marriage, both parties had been married before, one 
of the parties either brought a premarital home into the marriage 
or the home was purchased with that party's separate funds, title 
to the home w^s placed in joint tenancy within the first year of 
marriage, and the other party allegedly contributed labor, income 
and/or assets to remodel or improve the realty. 
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entire interest in his separately owned real property, was entitled to a one-half interest in the 
property upon the parties divorce. Plaintiffs reliance upon Hogue is misplaced. 
The Hogue case is factually distinguishable from the facts of the Georgedes. Jesperson 
and Lundgreen cases and the case at hand. In Hogue. the parties had been married for an 
unspecified period of time, were divorced, then remarried. Subsequent to their remarriage, 
In fact, Mr. Hogue transferred his entire interest in real property to his wife, as a means of 
protecting the property from his judgment creditors. Unlike the case at hand, there was no 
prenuptial agreement. The parties contracted for the purchase of additional acreage adjoining 
the real property. The parties cohabitated together on the property prior to being remarried, 
and the parties' second marriage lasted for over seven years. Lastly, the facts do not 
indicate whether Mr. Hogue had asked the trial court for anything more than a one-half 
interest in the property. 
Utah courts have held that upon divorce, each party should retain the separate 
property he or she brought into the marriage. Dunn v. Dunn. 802 ).2d 1314 (Ut.App. 
1990). In making a property division, a trial court should take into consideration all the 
pertinent circumstances of the parties' marriage. Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 
432 (Utah 1982); Jackson. 617 P.2d at 338; English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
The pertinent circumstances this court must consider are: (1) the duration of the 
marriage; (2) the parties' ages at time of marriage and whether any children were born into 
the marriage; (3) the" amount and kind of property to be divided, whether the property was 
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acquired before or during the marriage, and the source of the property; (4) the parties' 
standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs and earning capacity; and (5) the 
health of the parties. Hoeue. 831 P.2d 120 (Ut.App. 1992). 
The court notes the following facts. First, the parties were married for fewer than 
three years. From the day they were married, July 1, 1988, to the date of their final 
separation, December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine months. 
Additionally, during this twenty-nine month period the parties experienced a brief trial 
separation of five months. 
Second, plaintiff was 47 years old and defendant was 56 upon their marriage. The 
marriage was plaintifPs third marriage and was defendant's second marriage. No children 
were born into the marriage. 
Third, the amount which plaintiff is seeking to obtain, $52,500 (one-half the value of 
her 1990 appraisal on the home), substantially exceeds the monies she paid toward the 
remodeling of the home, $12,500. This court takes into consideration the fact that defendant 
has owned the property in question since 1966, and that at the time of marriage, the home 
was free and clear of all encumbrances and liens. 
The. home has special meaning to defendant since he has raised all nine of his children 
in the home. If this court were to award plaintiff one-half the value of the home, defendant 
would be forced to sell the home to reimburse plaintiff since he is unemployed. 
Fourth, defendant is not in the same financial situation as he was prior to marriage. 
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Due to a slowdown in his business and because of his deteriorating health, defendant was 
forced to sell his business. Defendant is currendy unemployed and is looking for work. On 
the other hand, Plaintiff has been employed at all times relevant hereto at Brigham Young 
University. Due to her younger age and higher salary, plaintiff has an opportunity to recoup 
some of her losses while defendant's age and health may prevent him from securing steady 
full-time employment. Plaintiffs wages have steadily increased during the marriage with 
reasonable expectation that they will continue to do so. 
Fifth, both parties liquidated substantial sums of their separate property assets and 
incurred substantial debts and obligations during the marriage. While plaintiff may have 
spent considerable sums during the marital period and incurred substantial debts an 
obligations, not all her expenditures or debts went to the marital estate. In 1989, plaintiff 
sold her major asset, the Monroe property. She immediately dispersed $24,000 to her 
children. This dispersement constituted the most significant reduction of her net worth 
during the marriage. 
It appears that the .deed was also drafted and executed with some haste. The parties 
were to married only three days after defendant executed the deed. The question that comes 
to mind is why would the parties execute two completely conflicting documents unless one 
was not anticipated or planned for by the parties? The antenuptial agreement was clearly 
intended by the parties to protect their separate property. That is precisely why they sought 
the services of an attorney. On the other hand, the warranty deed divested defendant of 
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fifty-percent of his ownership interest in his home. Clearly, the warranty deed was an 
afterthought by the parties. 
From the testimony of Mr. Nielson, counsel for plaintiff, it is not clear that he sent a 
copy of the subject deed to Ray Ivie, counsel for defendant, for his review. This fact seems 
to be substantiated by dates and notary acknowledgements of defendant's signature on the 
warranty deed and the antenuptial agreement. Defendant's June 29, 1988, signature on both 
the warranty deed and affidavit of surviving joint tenant was acknowledged by Mr. Nielson5s 
notary, Cynthia Shumway, while defendant's June 30, 1988 signature on the antenuptial 
agreement was acknowledge by Ivie & Young's notary, Lois Pinster. If the deed had been 
sent over to Ivie & Young for their review, prior to the deed's execution, defendant's 
signature would have been most likely notarized by Ivie & Young's notary as well. 
Under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in Georgedes. Jesperson and 
Lundgreen where one of the parties contributes separate property assets to remodel or 
improve a home brought into the marriage by the other spouse, and title to the home is 
placed in joint tenancy within the first year of marriage, it is equitable to return to the spouse 
who contributed their separate property assets to remodel or improve the premarital house 
that spouses actual remodeling expenditures plus one-half of the increase in value to the 
property is such increase exists. 
In the case at hand, the parties have stipulated that the value of defendant's premarital 
home in 1988, prior to the marriage and any improvements was $77,0000. The court has 
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found that the home's value was $105,000.00 upon the parties separation on December 1, 
1990. The parties stipulated that plaintiff contributed $12,562. 65 toward the remodeling of 
defendant's home and that defendant expended $11,931.00 on the remodeling. In addition, 
defendant reimbursed plaintiff $5,550.00 for remodeling costs. 
Based on the foregoing, even though the court has determined that the value of 
Defendant's premarital home upon the parties final separation was $105,000.00, this coun 
finds that the home did not increase in value since the value of defendant's premarital home 
in 1988 plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling or $106,993.65, 
exceeds the $105,000 appraised value of the home.4 
C. DECISION ON DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
Plaintiff is not entitled to one-half of defendant's interest in the home and plaintiff has 
no life estate. Taking into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances, it is just and 
equitable that plaintiff convey title to the subject property to defendant. 
Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for her actual pre-marriage and post marriage 
expenditures for remodeling in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. The balance of the 
4
 $77,000 [value of home in 1988] 
+ $12,562.65 [value of plaintiff's remodeling 
expenditures] 
+ $5,500 [amount defendant reimbursed plaintiff 
for remodeling] 
+ $11,931 [value of defendant's remodeling 
expenditures] 
$ 1 0 6 , 9 9 3 . 6 5 
17 
issues respecting personal property division and financial obligations are resolved by the 
stipulation and appear just and equitable. 
IE. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant proffered an 
offer of judgment to plaintiff of $24,000.00 on or about August 12, 1992. Since plaintiffs 
judgment is not more favorable than defendant's $24,000.00 offer, plaintiff must pay 
defendant's costs incurred after the making of the offer. Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and 
Richard L. Peel, Esq., counsel for defendant, have submitted affidavits in support of 
attorney's fees generated since August 12, 1992. The court finds the amount set forth to be 
fair and reasonable under the circumstances; $2,360.00 for the legal services of Mr. Peel and 
$2,289 for legal services rendered by Ms. Brown. Plaintiff is obligated to pay $4,649.00. 
The court finds that both the plaintiff and defendant are in need of financial assistance 
and, thereby, orders that each pay respective attorney's fees except as set forth above. 
Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and against the defendant, the same to 
become final and absolute upon signing by the court and entry by the clerk in the Registry of 
Actions. Plaintiff is also entitled to the restoration of her maiden name. 
Counsel have submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
in connection with this case. Upon review, defendant's proposal most closely reflects the 
ruling of the court except for the attorney's fee issue. 
The court directs counsel for the defendant to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of 
18 
1S7 
law and decree of divorce consistent with the foregoing decision of the Court and the 
stipulation of the parties received at trial. 
DATED AT PROVO, UTAH, this Jgfday of September, 1992. 
8 
\ \ 
BY THE COURT 
mz^>. 
ige Lynn W. Davis 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
K. NORMAN COX, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Case No. 904402060 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
I hereby certify that I caused to mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the court's Decision on September 28, 1992, to the following: 
Gary Weight, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ALDRIDGE, NELSON, WTEGHT & ESPLTN 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, UT 84603 
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 1266 
Richard L.- Peel, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
228 S. Fourth Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89101 
APPENDIX "D" 
Notice of Appeal 
,JP-
hJn- 7*7 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 south Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
- -} i"i '3? 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JANET R. COX, p 
Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL^ 
-VS- Civil No. 904402060 
K. NORMAN COX, Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION, by and through her 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby appeals from the 
final Judgment Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled action; 
entered on or about October 28, 1992. 
DATED THIS f^T day of A^O V T£ /Y\b£\_
 / 1992. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon 
defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an 
envelope addressed to: 
MARILYN MOODY BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84606 
RICHARD PEEL 
Attorney for Defendant 
228 South Fourth Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the _2jTday of AJO u ^ ^ Q g y , 1992. 
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APPENDIX "E" 
Antenuptial Property Agreement 
C©F/ 
ANTENUPTIAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT 
Antenuptial Agreement made this 3C^T1 day of OlMflQ 
19 £8 , between KENNETH NORMAN COX, an adult, hereinafter 
referred to as prospective husband, and JANET J. REX, an adult, 
hereinafter referred to as prospective wife, in consideration of 
the contemplated marriage of the above-named parties. 
RECITALS 
A. A marriage-is intended and desired to be solemnized 
between the parties hereto. 
B. Each of the parties is possessed of property which they 
separately own or have an interest in their own individual right. 
C. Each of the parties has made a full disclosure to the 
other party of all of his or her property and assets and of the 
value thereof, and this Agreement is entered into with a full 
knowledge on the part of each as to the extent and probable value 
of the estate of the other, and of all the rights conferred by 
law on each in- the estate of the other by virtue of such proposed 
marriage. 
D. In4anticipation of such marriage the parties desire to 
fix and determine the rights of each of them in any and all 
property of every nature and description and wheresoever located 
that the other of them may own or have an interest in at the time 
of such marriage or may acquire thereafter. 
E. Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage 
or dispose separately by gift, will or otherwise all of. his or 
her estate to the same extent as if each of such parties remained 
single. 
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, 
the parties agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Each of the parties hereto shall retain the title, manage-
ment and control of the estates now owned by each of them, 
whether real, personal or mixed, and all increase or addition 
thereto, entirely free and unmolested by the other party and may 
encumber, sell, dispose, give or provide by will for the dispo-
sition of any or all of such estates so separately owned and 
possessed. At the death of either no claim by inheritance, des-
cent, surviving spouse award, homestead, dower or maintenance 
shall be made by either of the parties hereto against the other 
or against the estate of the other. 
ARTICLE II 
Each of the parties hereto separately waives any and all 
rights by dower, homestead, surviving spouse award, inheritance, 
descent or any other marital right arising by virtue of statute 
or otherwise in and to any parcel of the estate now owned and 
possessed by the other, and does hereby agree and consent that 
each shall have full power and control in all respects to exer-
cise free and undisputed ownership, management and disposition of 
each of such estates and increases thereto now owned and pos-
sessed by the parties, and each of such parties does waive and 
renounce any legal and statutory rights that might, under any 
law, be set up against any part of the estate of the other and 
does consent that the estate of each shall descend or be disposed 
of by will or otherwise to the heirs or legatees or devisees of 
each of the parties, free and clear of any claim by inheritance, 
dower, surviving spouse award or homestead or maintenance or any 
claim otherwise given bylaw to a husband and wife. 
ARTICLE" III 
This Agreement shall not in any manner, bar or affect, the 
right of either party to claim and receive any property of any 
nature or character that the other party hereto, by last will, or 
by any other instrument, may give, devise, bequeath, transfer or 
assign to the other party hereto. 
ARTICLE IV 
If either party shall mortgage, pledge, or sell and convey, 
his or her real or personal estate, whether in whole or in part, 
the other party hereto shall, upon demand, from time to time join 
in any and every mortgage, or deed of conveyance, or in any other 
instrument that may be necessary or desirable to make the same 
effectual. 
ARTICLE V 
In the event that at any time during the existence of the 
marital relationship between the parties, they should be or 
become residents of a state under the laws of which husband and 
wife acquire property interests commonly known as community 
property or any other property and interests different from the 
property interests of husband and wife under the laws of the 
State of Utah, their property interests shall nevertheless remain 
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the same as they would have been under the terms of this agree-
ment construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
and the parties will each, at any time during or after the termi-
nation of the marital relationship, execute and deliver any and 
all deeds and other instruments desirable or necessary to trans-
fer any right, title or interest, in any property or estate of 
the other which they may acquire by virtue of any so-called 
community property laws to the persons who would otherwise be 
entitled thereto by virtue of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE VI 
If the prospective husband shall survive the prospective 
wife, the prospective husband shall not, as surviving husband, 
make any claim to any part, or share, of the real and/or personal 
estate of which the prospective wife may die seized or possessed. 
The prospective husband, in consideration of such marriage, 
hereby expressly waives and relinquishes all right in and to the 
real property of which the prospective wife may die seized, as 
well as all right in and to the personal estate of the pro-
spective wife, or a surviving husband, heir-at-law, or otherwise. 
ARTICLE^ VII 
If the prospective wife shall survive the prospective hus-
band , she shall not, as surviving wife, make any claim to any 
part, or share, of the real and/or personal estate of which the 
prospective husband may die seized or possessed. The prospective 
wife hereby waives and relinquishes all claims to an allowance, 
homestead, widow's award, or any other right in and to the real 
and/or personal estate of which the prospective husband may die 
seized or possessed. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Neither party hereto, by virtue of such marriage, shall 
have, or acquire, any-right, title cr claim in and to the real or 
personal estate of the other, that the estate of each shall 
descend to or vest in his or her, heirs-at-law, legatees, or 
devisees, as may be prescribed by his or her last will and 
testament, or in default of such last will and testament, by the 
law then in force, as though no marriage had ever taken place 
between the parties. 
ARTICLE IX 
* * 
This Agreement is entered into by the parties hereto with 
full knowledge on the part of each of the extent and probable 
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value of all of the property or estate of the other, and of all 
rights that, but for this Agreement, would be conferred by law 
upon each of them in the property or estate of the other, by 
virtue of the consummation of the proposed marriage, and the 
rights of the respective parties hereto in and to each other's 
property, or estate, of whatsoever character the same may be, 
shall be determined, fixed and settled by this Agreement, and not 
otherwise• Prospective husband represents that, on the date of 
this Agreement, the approximate value of his property and assets 
is THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 POLLARDS 380,000.00 ) . 
Prospective wife represents that, on the date of this Agreement, 
the approximate value of her property and assets is SEVENTY 
THOUSAND ANH NO/100 HOI I ARS ($ 7Q.000,00 ) • 
ARTICLE X 
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the 
parties relating to their antenuptial property arrangements. 
There are no oral Agreements between the parties respecting such 
antenuptial property arrangements. Any alteration or modifica-
tion of this Agreement must be in writing, signed and acknow-
ledged by each of the parties hereto. 
ARTICLE XT 
This Agreement shall bind the parties hereto and their 
respective heirs, administrators and assigns, and shall become 
effective only upon the consummation of the proposed marriage 
between the parties hereto, and if such marriage does not take 
place, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
ARTICLE XII 
The parties hereto both stipulate that they, and each of 
them, were represented by legal counsel of their choice in the 
preparation of..this Agreement; that they have read this Agreement 
and have had its contents explained,, and to each of them, by such 
counsel; and that they fully understand the terms, provisions, 
and legal consequences of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement 
at Provo, Utah, the day and year first above written. 
Ckf: 
'KENNETH NORMAN^JCOX ' / 
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%n«<i^)/P^ JANJflT" J- K E ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) 
ss. 
) 
On .Tunc 30 \<m m, personally appeared before me 
KENNETH NORMAN C0Xf one of the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed th$, ,i# 
same. ^ ^ - - ' ^ X 
Jt)TARY PUBLIC : - ': ••-_:* 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing At: 
' ,\^  .•>' 
r o f *••* 
-. J\ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) 
ss. 
) 
On June 28, 1988 ., personally appeared before me 
JANET J. REX, one of the signers of the foregoing instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing At: .. Provo, Utah 
August 14, 1991 
' M 4 1 
RTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY 
certify that I am a licensed 
..ixttect to practice law in the State of Utah; that I 
have corisultea>-w4Lth KENNETH NORMAN COX, who is a party to the 
foregoing Agreement, and that I have fully advised him of his 
property rights and the legal significance of the foregoing 
Agreement; and that KENNETH NORMAN COX has acknowledged his full 
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and complete understanding of the legal consequences and of the 
terms and provisions of the foregoing Agreement—and has freely 
and voluntarily executed the Agreement in my^ presei 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss. 
On 
e iris 
mi personally appeared before me 
., Attorney at law, signer of the 
abov n trument, who duly acknowledged to me that he exec^teed*^ 
the same.
 0^
v
 ^PM/^'S 
My Commission Expire^: 
Residing At: mv/i \Wh 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
-" mm m • ^  1 
\*r •„, c Or ^ % 
'"•MHHM**11 
CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY 
I, DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, certify that I am a licensed 
attorney, admitted to practice law in the State of Utah; that I 
have consulted with JANET J. REX, who is a party to the foregoing 
Agreement, and that I have fully advised her of her property 
rights and the legal significance of the foregoing Agreement; and 
that JANET J. REX has acknowledged her full and complete under-
standing of the legal consequences and of the terms and pro-
visions of the foregoing Agreement anq^-has freely and voluntarily 
executed the Agreement in my presence 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss, 
On June 28, 1988
 t personally appeared before me 
DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, Attorney at law, signer of the above. 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
I 
My Commission Expires: August 14, 1991 
Residing At: Provo, Utah 
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APPENDIX "P» 
Warranty Deed 
sH. * 3 7 C 2 ?K 2 3 2 2 P<5 7 9 4 -
•>:>(* 3 «£:D UTAH C2LHTY GORGES Zlr 
1*23 .UN 30 3 : ; i An FEE 3 . 0 0 
'ECQRDEO FOR DOUGLAS A NIELSON 
WARRANTY DEED P£f. &.#fo 
NORMAN COX, grantor, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to NORMAN 
COX and JANET J. REX, as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivor- ship and not as tenants in common, grantees, of 773 
Soutn 400 East, Orem, Utah, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) 
and other valuable consideration, the following described real 
property situated in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 400 
East Street, Orem, Utah,#and the grantors South fence line 
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet 
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 South, Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the 
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88• 
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 2 41.35 
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0# 44' 
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South 
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line 
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of begin-
ning. 
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Together with all appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
This deed is hereby made expressly subject to all existing 
and recorded restrictions, exceptions, reservations, easements, 
rights-of-way, conditions, liens, encumbrances, and covenants of 
whatever nature, if any, and is expressly subject to all munici-
pal, city, county, and state zoning laws and other ordinances, 
regulations, and restrictions, including statutes and other laws 
of municipal, county, or other governmental authorities appli-
cable to and enforceable against the premises described herein. 
WITNESS the hands of said grantors this / ^r 
/A/ , , 19 *w*—. 
dav of 
y 
/V 
NORMAN COX 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On Jure 29, 4?88 , personally appeared before 
EXHIBIT ^ 
£ H T 1 S 7 0 2 SK 2 5 2 2 ?Q 7 9 ? 
me NORMAN COX, the s i g n e r of t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , who duly 
acknowledged t o me t h a t he e x e c u t e d t h e same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC I* . * 1 -
My Commission E x p i r e s : August U, 1991 '--C;j 
R e s i d i n g At: 3rovo,, Utan x. 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
Douglas A. tfielson 
3 319 ttorrh U n i v e r s i t y Avenue, S u i t e 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO: 
Granrees 
773 South 400 East 
Oremf Utah 34058 
AFFIDAVIT CF SURVIVING JOINT TENANT 
iHTlSTOl 5K 2 3 ^ 2 *G 7 
NINA 3 *£:0 UTAH COUNT?"RECORDED 
) 19SS JUN 30 *:43 AH ?rr i^gf 
RECORDED FGR CCUGLAS A MIELSQH : ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY CF UTAH ) 
NORMAN COX, of legal age, being duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
Thar RUBY GURR DUKE COX, the decedent mentioned in the 
attached certified copy of Certificate of Death, is the sane 
person as RUBY S. cox", named as one of the parties in that 
certain Quit-Claim Deed dated November 6, 1967, executed by MARY 
ANN DUKE, FENTON J- ?RINCE and LILLIAN T. PRINCE, recorded as 
Entry No. 7627, in Book _LLLZ_/ Page 73 of official records 
of Utah County, State of Utah, concerning the real property 
situated in the County of Utah, State of Utah and described as 
follows: 
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 4 00 
East Street, Orem, Utah, and the grantors South fence line 
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet 
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 South, Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the 
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88* 
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 241.35 
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0# 44' 
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South 
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line 
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of begin-
ning. 
DATED this * s? day of J 19 
^ 
NORMAN COX 
773 South 400 East 
Orem, Utah 3 4 053 
Telephone: (301) 225-: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
: ss. 
) 
On the 2ftt?i day of June , 19 53 , 
personally appeared before me NORMAN COX, tne signer cf the 
within and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. 
- P EHTiSVo 1 SK 2 3 2 2 PS T*? 1 
Notary P u b l i c ~ 
My Ccmmissicn E x p i r e s : 
Res id ing At: Prcvo. wtin 
August 14, 1991 
